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Cybersecurity of Control Room of the Future
Using Artificial Intelligence to Strengthen Power Grid Cyber Resilience to Advanced Persistent Threats
Power grids are currently facing novel and incumbent cybersecurity challenges posed by advanced persistent threats (APTs). They are perpetrated by advanced, often state-sponsored adversaries targeting transmission and distribution system operators. APTs and emerging well-resourced cyberattacks on control centers, digital substations, renewables, and storage technologies can cause distributed contingencies across the power system leading to N-k components being suddenly disconnected from the power grid. Cyberattacks may instigate multiple, unprecedented excitation modes and lead to protection schemes disconnecting other generators and power lines, which result in a fast domino effect called cascading failures. The impact of a cyberattack on power system dynamics can be fundamentally different from the consequences of physical faults or contingencies. APTs can speed up the cascading failure mechanisms, leading to an accelerated point of no return in the cascading failures sequence and potentially cause a blackout much faster than historical blackouts initiated by physical disturbances. This leaves insufficient time for reactive measures to contain the spread of disruptions and may result in an unprecedented large-scale, continental blackout.
Virtualization in digital substations is a rising trend in the power sector, opening up interesting research avenues. The virtualization of intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) is thought to enable more flexible and agile cybersecurity software updates and patching processes while seamlessly integrating with current physical IEDs. However, no studies have yet considered a general cybersecurity assessment for such novel hybrid systems. To fill this gap, a systematic cybersecurity assessment of a digital substation composed of hybrid (virtual and physical) IEDs is presented in this paper. A testbed was developed to assess the different attack vectors with a focus on targeting virtual machines (resource exhaustion) and injection attacks on IEC 61850-compliant communication streams. A hybrid protection selectivity use case was successfully demonstrated with multiple targeted cyber attacks on the testbed where the non-attacked IED successfully cleared the grid fault. The attacks’ impacts ranged from minor to major effects on the IEDs’ tripping signals (and eventually circuit breaker actions) including forced signal delays, signal latching, and signal drops. The results of this study highlight the importance of providing a proper cybersecurity by design strategy for integrating hybrid substation systems with virtualization technologies.
Cyber Security of HVDC Systems
A Review of Cyber Threats, Defense, and Testbeds
High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) technology is one of the key enablers of the energy transition, especially for offshore wind energy systems. While extensive research on cyber security of High Voltage Alternating Current (HVAC) systems has been conducted, limited research exists on cyber security aspects of HVDC systems. These systems exhibit unique attributes, in comparison to HVAC systems, such as longer transmission line distances and increased volume of data samples for wide-area monitoring, control, and protection applications. These factors lead to a higher vulnerability of HVDC systems to cyber attacks. Existing state-of-the-art HVDC surveys, however, are primarily focused on HVDC physical components and exclude cyber security elements. Therefore, this paper presents the first detailed survey on the cyber security of HVDC Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). We present a comprehensive review of the state-of-the-art HVDC systems, with a special focus on cyber threats and vulnerabilities, defense and mitigation strategies, and testbeds. Based on the review and analysis, insights and recommendations on future research directions to address the research gaps in this field of study are provided. Future research on cyber security for HVDC systems should prioritize the integration of cyber and physical system data and focus on early-stage detection to mitigate the potentially severe impacts of cyber attacks on HVDC grids.