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N. Cibin

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Using Artificial Intelligence to Strengthen Power Grid Cyber Resilience to Advanced Persistent Threats

Journal article (2026) - Alexandru Ştefanov, Nicola Cibin, Maarten Hoeve, Saurabh Talwar, Joey Godefrooi, Dirk Van Hofwegen
Power grids are currently facing novel and incumbent cybersecurity challenges posed by advanced persistent threats (APTs). They are perpetrated by advanced, often state-sponsored adversaries targeting transmission and distribution system operators. APTs and emerging well-resourced cyberattacks on control centers, digital substations, renewables, and storage technologies can cause distributed contingencies across the power system leading to N-k components being suddenly disconnected from the power grid. Cyberattacks may instigate multiple, unprecedented excitation modes and lead to protection schemes disconnecting other generators and power lines, which result in a fast domino effect called cascading failures. The impact of a cyberattack on power system dynamics can be fundamentally different from the consequences of physical faults or contingencies. APTs can speed up the cascading failure mechanisms, leading to an accelerated point of no return in the cascading failures sequence and potentially cause a blackout much faster than historical blackouts initiated by physical disturbances. This leaves insufficient time for reactive measures to contain the spread of disruptions and may result in an unprecedented large-scale, continental blackout. ...
Cyber attacks targeting Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) in digital substations can disrupt power system operation, causing equipment damage, instability, cascading failures, and even a blackout. Cyber–Physical Power System (CPPS) datasets are critically needed to develop novel methods for the detection and prevention of cyber attacks on digital substations. In this paper, a novel CPPS dataset is proposed for cyber security of digital substations, including real-time power system measurements, i.e., electromagnetic transient three-phase voltages and currents, communication network traffic, and virtual IED resource metrics. Various scenarios are simulated on an IEC 61850-compliant testbed consisting of Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) and physical and virtual IEDs in hardware-in-the-loop configuration. The dataset contains different operating conditions and cyber attack scenarios, i.e., normal operation, single-phase-to-ground fault, network reconnaissance, resource exhaustion, and IEC 61850 Generic Object-Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) and Sampled Values (SV) injection attacks. This work aims to provide the research community with a comprehensive and high-fidelity dataset to be used for the design and testing of novel methodologies to increase the cyber security of power grids. ...
Conference paper (2026) - N. Cibin, Marijn Boringa, I. Semertzis, Alex Stefanov
The increasing digitalization of the power grid and widespread adoption of the IEC 61850 standard have raised concerns regarding the cyber security of electrical substations. In particular, the Sampled Values (SV) protocol lacks inherent security mechanisms, leaving protection and control functions vulnerable to malicious SV frames injection. To address this challenge, a method using hybrid statistical-deep learning was previously proposed to detect, prevent, and localize SV injection attacks in digital substations, while ensuring minimal latency and near-zero false positives. In this work, we evaluate and experimentally validate the real-time implementation of the proposed Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) using a hardware-in-the-loop testbed consisting of a Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS), Raspberry Pi implementing the intrusion prevention method, and an industrial intelligent electronic device. Multiple operating scenarios are considered to evaluate fault clearance latency, communication reliability, IPS classification performance, and IPS impact on protection schemes. Results demonstrate that the IPS introduces less than 150 μs of additional delay, achieves a near-zero false positive rate in the absence of cyber attacks, and attains an F1-score above 99% in preventing SV injection attacks, while preserving substation protection and control functionalities. These findings confirm the practicality and effectiveness of the proposed IPS for deployment in IEC 61850-compliant digital substations. ...
Conference paper (2026) - A. Presekal, V. Rajkumar, H. Goyel, N. Cibin, P. Palensky, J. Godefrooi, A. Ştefanov
The increasing digitalization of power grids has introduced cyber security vulnerabilities. One of the vulnerabilities is related to the IEC 61850 Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) protocol for time-critical communication between Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs). This protocol lacks built-in message integrity and authentication mechanisms, making it susceptible to cyber attacks, e.g., spoofing. To address these vulnerabilities, IEC 62351-6:2020 recommends the usage of a Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC). However, implementing this security measure in existing brownfield digital substations is challenging due to the lack of compatible commercial devices and is economically expensive. Therefore, this research proposes and evaluates a cost-effective cyber security enhancement using commodity hardware, e.g., Raspberry Pi, to implement HMAC-based message authentication for ensuring GOOSE message integrity and authentication in brownfield digital substations with respect to stringent time requirements for the operation of protective relays. The proposed solution ensures message integrity and authentication while maintaining compliance with standard requirements. Validation is performed using real commercial IEDs in a real-time Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) architecture, demonstrating that the solution meets substation time requirements. This approach provides a feasible and immediate cyber security enhancement for brownfield digital substations without requiring significant infrastructure changes. ...
Journal article (2025) - Nadine Kabbara, Nicola Cibin, Hugo Morais, Alexandru Ştefanov, Madeleine Gibescu
Virtualization in digital substations is a rising trend in the power sector, opening up interesting research avenues. The virtualization of intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) is thought to enable more flexible and agile cybersecurity software updates and patching processes while seamlessly integrating with current physical IEDs. However, no studies have yet considered a general cybersecurity assessment for such novel hybrid systems. To fill this gap, a systematic cybersecurity assessment of a digital substation composed of hybrid (virtual and physical) IEDs is presented in this paper. A testbed was developed to assess the different attack vectors with a focus on targeting virtual machines (resource exhaustion) and injection attacks on IEC 61850-compliant communication streams. A hybrid protection selectivity use case was successfully demonstrated with multiple targeted cyber attacks on the testbed where the non-attacked IED successfully cleared the grid fault. The attacks’ impacts ranged from minor to major effects on the IEDs’ tripping signals (and eventually circuit breaker actions) including forced signal delays, signal latching, and signal drops. The results of this study highlight the importance of providing a proper cybersecurity by design strategy for integrating hybrid substation systems with virtualization technologies. ...

A Review of Cyber Threats, Defense, and Testbeds

High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) technology is one of the key enablers of the energy transition, especially for offshore wind energy systems. While extensive research on cyber security of High Voltage Alternating Current (HVAC) systems has been conducted, limited research exists on cyber security aspects of HVDC systems. These systems exhibit unique attributes, in comparison to HVAC systems, such as longer transmission line distances and increased volume of data samples for wide-area monitoring, control, and protection applications. These factors lead to a higher vulnerability of HVDC systems to cyber attacks. Existing state-of-the-art HVDC surveys, however, are primarily focused on HVDC physical components and exclude cyber security elements. Therefore, this paper presents the first detailed survey on the cyber security of HVDC Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). We present a comprehensive review of the state-of-the-art HVDC systems, with a special focus on cyber threats and vulnerabilities, defense and mitigation strategies, and testbeds. Based on the review and analysis, insights and recommendations on future research directions to address the research gaps in this field of study are provided. Future research on cyber security for HVDC systems should prioritize the integration of cyber and physical system data and focus on early-stage detection to mitigate the potentially severe impacts of cyber attacks on HVDC grids. ...