Almost everyone is familiar with games such as poker and checkers, but games can also be found in non-entertaining settings, such as competing companies in a market or conflict resolutions between countries. However, what happens when players want to avoid working together? This thesis provides two game-theoretical models of boycotts based on existing literature and is complemented with new insights. We discuss the dynamic process of a consumer boycott, where the effectiveness can be determined by the predefined consumers’ and firm’s thresholds or by the maximum boycott duration. Besides, we consider a static model using the Shapley value to analyze the impacts of boycotts, which are balanced for 2-player boycotts but not when three players are involved. We extended the existing models by finding supermodularity as a sufficient requirement for the boycott to never be profitable for the involved players, by introducing a direct formula for the coalition value in a boycott game (the boycott-contraction), and by analyzing real-world data, where we observe the effect of boycotts on trading activities with uninvolved players.

Heat transfer by radiation is something you experience everyday: when walking outside in the sun or when cooking your diner. This thesis provides understandable models of the role that radiation plays in the transfer of heat. By studying literature we developed a mathematical basis for the heat transfer model, where we discuss diffusive, convective and radiative heat transfer, the weighted sum of grey gases and the chosen solving method: the discrete ordinates method. Using CONVERGE CFD and MATLAB software, we present several one- and threedimensional simulations of a furnace in which we consider different conditions. The overall conclusion is that radiation transports heat from places with high temperatures to their cooler surroundings, where also conditions as isolation, wall emissivity and gas mixture play an important role.