Scheduling electric vehicles to chargers through iterative double auction mechanism

Conference paper (2019)

Authors

J. Gao Concordia University

Jia Yuan Yu Concordia University

Chun Wang Concordia University

Terrence Wong Concordia University

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Optimization Scheduling Electric vehicles Auction Two-sided mechanism

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Published Date

2019

Language

English

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Abstract

Consider a decentralized electric vehicle (EV) charging scheduling problem where the chargers and vehicles are modeled as utility maximizing agents. To schedule chargers to vehicles in a day-ahead market, we propose a double auction mechanism, where chargers report their time availabilities and charging costs and vehicles report their preferences on different chargers. This auction is conducted in an iterative manner which enables the computation of effective schedules through multilateral negotiation between agents. We evaluate the efficiency performance of the mechanism through a computational study. The result generated from the iterative double auction mechanism is on average 35% better than the first come first serve (FCFS) allocation policy.